Introduction
What if racial profiling were useful? Even, perhaps, very useful? Are the costs of racial profiling so significant that racial profiling should be banned? Courts and commentators do not ask these questions; indeed, they rarely, if ever, acknowledge that racial profiling may be useful. This paper explores what costs police would have to justify, and how they might do so in order to use racial profiling legally.
Using race as a part of a profile of criminal has some efficiency value; it is not solely (or even at all) about racial animus. Race is a marker of criminal behavior; it would be miraculous if it where not. Height, weight, gender, hair style, ear piercings, all of these characteristics almost surely delineate some difference in the commission rate of at least one crime. This is, essentially, a mathematical truism: race and crime are not independent.
Because race is "useful" when "useful" is defined as "information worth more than zero," it is important to move beyond the initial question -is it useful -to the more important question -how useful is it? What do we give up in allowing or banning racial profiling?
What are courts missing when they discuss racial profiling? This paper is an attempt to get at least some of the empirics correct regarding the direct costs and benefits of racial profiling; it leaves the important research of mapping the collateral consequences of racial profiling to others.
But even when one puts aside the collateral consequences of focusing the might of the criminal justice system on one specific race, there are many complicating factors in measuring how useful racial profiling. First, how do you measure the gap in crime rates (that is, the different crime rates for different racial groups and different crimes)? Without this, no one could calibrate their behavior: police would not know how much to profile, and the courts would not know how much reliance on race in police decision-making is too much. This is also important as a policy matter, to determine what society loses if racial profiling were not allowed. To be more concrete, what if whites were twice as likely to sell cocaine as Blacks were? Does this justify profiling them? Perhaps the answer to this depends on the base rate: how much more cocaine do white people sell? Is this a difference between one and two percent, or fifteen and thirty percent of individuals who could be targeted. One needs to know more than just a single statistic. A second complicating factor, beyond the initial measurement question, is whether race is too easy to over-use. People see race quickly, and believe it is a highly salient part of a persons physical description; police might over-rely on this characteristic because it is easy to determine (or at least perceived to be so). A third complication is that race is rarely the only available information about a potential suspect, and a better question than whether race is correlated with crime rates is whether information about a suspects race adds any useful information to a profile. But, again, the chance that these two probabilities are always equal, for every type of crime and any other possible set of information is zero. Race matters. This bears emphasis not because it isnt obvious, but because many opposed to racial profiling deem it inefficient automatically; that is, they argue that racial profiling does not work because race is not a predictor of criminality.
Answering these questions is a difficult, but not insurmountable task. But these questions also suggest that a simple focus on whether race is a predictor of criminality is misplaced; the answer to that first question is yes. The more important question, which legislatures, courts, legal and economic researchers alike have generally ignored, is when and how useful racial profiling is in different situations. To answer this question, one needs to investigate the costs and benefits of racial profiling, which the above complicating factors suggest can be done, but needs more attention to the detail of the reality of the relationship of race and crime to answer. This paper seeks to quantify the costs and benefits of racial profiling, and in doing so creates new methods to control for the problem of selection bias in the data that are generally available to evaluate this question.
The Problem of Selection Bias in Racial Profiling
Statisticians have long recognized the problem of selection into samples that selection into a sample, if non-random, can create significant bias. The prototypical example is an examination of womens wages in the 1970s: women may choose not to work, meaning that they self-select to remain out of any sample of womens wages. A sample of employed women by definition includes only those women who do work. Performing inference on this non-random sample incorrectly estimates the importance of various factors on womens wages. (Heckman 1979) .
The same selection bias problem occurs in a wide variety of circumstances, and is particularly acute in many legal applications where researchers must rely upon criminal justice data. Indeed, scholars have long recognized the threat of selection bias in data related to the criminal justice system, and have focused on racial profiling as one context in which selection bias is a significant concern. Racial profiling involves acting on the belief -be it based upon racial animus, rational, or a combination of the two -that certain crimes are committed disproportionately by a particular race. Unfortunately, data on criminal activity -necessary to disentangle whether and why racial profiling occurs, are not free of society's assumptions and stereotypes. Not only does society shape views on race including stereotypes and assumptions -but society's views also feedback to shape the society we live in and how one describes it empirically. Look for drug couriers only among Blacks and you will likely find some; what you wont find is a white drug courier. Then look at the people youve arrested and jailed, and it is easy to see how the initial perceptions of criminality get reinforced. Over decades, a stereotype that Blacks are more likely to engage in criminal activity can transform itself into large and statistically significant differences in arrest and incarceration rates for Blacks and whites.
There are some data suggesting that American society has experienced this form of self-fulfilling racial bias in drug prosecutions. For example, Black youth are seen as more likely than white youth to engage in drug use and violent behavior; arrest and incarceration rates reinforce this perception. Yet self-reported data consistently reveals that except for homicide, Black and white youth have similar propensities to violent crime and Blacks are, if anything, less likely than whites to use illegal drugs. Because biases can be reinforced through action, an initial focus on Blacks as drug couriers will be validated and reinforced by the data: police will believe that their profile is accurate, because they arrest more Blacks for drug possession. Put simply, the data on stop and search rates and the data on arrest and incarceration rates alone cannot demonstrate that Blacks are more likely to be guilty of drug-related offenses. Without an answer to this empirical question, one cannot separate fact from stereotype in the debate surrounding racial profiling as a tool of drug interdiction.
This project creates methods to control for selection bias and other data problems. In doing so, it seeks to separate fact from stereotype by estimating empirically the extent to which the stereotypes used to justify racial profiling are based on actual propensities to commit drug crimes. In particular, the project investigates the counterfactual: what would police find if they did not use race in deciding whom to search during highway traffic stops?
By doing so, the methods allow quantification of the potential benefits and costs of using race as a factor in the decision to stop and search a vehicle. Quantifying these costs and benefits brings empirical reality, rather than stereotype and supposition, to the normative debate regarding the efficacy and justifications of racial profiling. The new methods, of course, are not limited to the racial profiling context, and provide an important tool to researchers who seek to control for selection bias in the wide variety of contexts where individual-level data on the non-selected population is unavailable. U. S. 306 (2003) . Persico (2008) notes this disparity, but concludes that it is unimportant, conflating the legal question of whether race was used with the legal justification of the use of race. Instead, KPT seek only to differentiate between types of racial profilingthe "good" kind, which is rational and based on Blacks having an a priori higher payoff to carrying drugs, and the "bad" kind, which is irrational, inefficient, and solely based on racial animus. Antonovics and Knight suggest that this is the legally salient question. On a practical level, Antonovics and Knight may simply be suggesting that causation is difficult to prove in racial profiling cases; a rational use of race might, in fact, be a rational use of some unobserved characteristic of the motorists that is simply correlated with race. At best, the KPT model is agnostic with respect to whether race is an explicit factor in the troopers decision to search.
The equal protection standard articulated in Grutter requires the state to articulate a compelling interest (e.g., drug interdiction), and that the means by which the state realizes its goal be narrowly tailored to minimize the extraneous racial effect of the policy. (first, whether it occurs, and second, whether it is justified if it does); the research simply stops too soon in the analysis, both for lack of data and lack of appropriate methods to fully utilize the data available.
In prior work, I investigated whether racial profiling of stopped vehicles using race as a factor in the decision to search a stopped vehicle was productive (Barnes 2005). The results suggested that the police did engage in racial profiling, and that its effects were ambiguous: while disproportionately searching vehicles stopped with Black drivers increases the amount of drugs seized slightly, it also increases the number of innocent motorists whose vehicles are searched. This cost suggests that the policy may not be narrowly tailored. But the universe of stopped vehicles was clearly not a random sample of drivers on the highway; based on a study of the race of drivers on the highway, Black motorists were 1.7 times more likely to be stopped than white motorists. Without a random sample of drivers on the highway, the full picture of racial profiling is unknown. Because the Heckman selection model I use only controls for the second step of the selection, from stop to search, the conclusions I draw are valid only if one assumes that the police will not change their selection of whom to stop. The selection model cannot control for the first step: the decision to stop a vehicle driving down the highway, and therefore must assume that the universe of stopped vehicles is equivalent to the universe of vehicles driving down the highway. This lack of individual-level data on highway drivers motivates the statistical model that follows.
Statistical Motivation
Currently, there are several statistical methods to control for selection bias. The best known is the Heckman selection model, created by economist James Heckman. (Heckman 1979) .
While a significant leap in the ability to control for selection bias, the Heckman selection model has two primary disadvantages. First, its parametric assumptions identify the model without any information from the data, meaning that the assumptions of the model, rather than the data, may drive the results. (Heckman and Honore 1990). Second, the Heckman selection model requires the researcher to obtain individual-level data on the non-selected population in addition to individual-level data on the selected population. In many cases, these data are unavailable. In the racial profiling context, one question of interest is whether police use the race of the driver in their decision to search a vehicle. In order to answer this question, one would need to control for the mix of drivers that a police officer could stop, along with the mix of suspicious behavior in which different drivers engage. There are several selection mechanisms involved here: a driver must decide to drive down the highway (and decide whether to carry contraband); a police officer must decide whether to stop a vehicle; a police officer must decide the level of scrutiny to apply to the driver and car to determine whether to search the car; and, finally, the police officer must decide whether to search the car, and with what intensity. All of these decisions to drive (with or without possessing drugs), stop or search a carare non-random, and depend on the in-dividual propensity of the driver to carry drugs. Without controlling for these decisions, it is impossible to answer many questions about racial profiling. Finally, without individuallevel data on individuals who did not get stopped, or searched, or did not drive down the highway, even the Heckman selection model cannot be estimated.
With respect to the first disadvantage, several researchers, including Heckman himself, have worked to create nonparametric selection models that allow the data, rather than the parametric model assumptions, to determine the results. (See, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil 2006) . This project focuses on the second disadvantage of the Heckman selection model, that it requires individual-level data on the non-selected population. This is a significant limitation because such data can be very difficult to obtain.
A second general method that corrects for confounding of variables, and to some extent selection bias, is propensity score matching. This method has been used successfully in legal empirical applications (Ho 2005) , and is widely used in other disciplines. It too, however, requires individual-level data.
A Bayesian Model of Selection
This project tackles the second disadvantage of the Heckman selection model: the need for individual-level data. I develop a method by which a researcher can control for selection bias using aggregate data: means, standard deviations, and correlations of variables rather than the actual data from individuals. As an illustration of the method, I estimate the model using drug interdiction data to determine whether police engage in racial profiling.
To create a Bayesian model of selection, I modify the rubric of Geweke et al. (2003) (GGT), and model the selection as a two-stage process: first, I model the police decision to stop and search an individual traveling on the highway as a Bayesian probit regression, and second, for those that they search, I model the quantity of drugs seized as a standard 
and the following definitions:
In this model, y * The correlation between the two error terms, ρ defines the extent of selection; a larger ρ (in absolute value) means greater selection and selection bias. In practice, for a Bayesian model, I re-parametrize the error terms and their correlation as follows: 1i = δ 2i + η i where η i ∼ N (0, 1). Operationally, δ is easier to estimate directly, and ρ can easily be recovered by the formula: ρ = δ √ 1+δ 2 . In a standard Bayesian selection model, β λ, and δ are parameters that require prior distributions to estimate; y * 1i , y * 2i are latent variables that are treated as parameters to be estimated because they are unobserved; and y 1i , y 2i , X i , Z i are known data used to estimate the model. The model is computed using Bayes Law (familiar to statisticians and Evidence scholars both):
With appropriate prior guesses that are vague and uninformative, the data drives the resulting final estimate I assume a prior distribution for each of the three sets of parameters, β, λ, δ, to be normally distributed, and independent of each other. Specifically,
The hyperparameters β 0 , λ 0 , δ 0 are fixed to 0 a priori in the model, but could theoretically be another parameter to estimate, allowing for more flexibility. There are also priors on the variances of ( σ 2 β , σ 2 λ , σ 2 δ , respectively). As is standard in Bayesian regression, these variances are assumed to be distributed inverse gamma, which allows for all values from 0 to ∞. Specifically,
where A β , A λ , A δ , S 
An Initial Comparison
Recent work by Strnad has suggested that legal empirical scholarship incorporate more 
Incorporating Aggregate-Level Data
The model I describe above is simply a Bayesian version of a standard Heckman selection model; the Bayesian model also requires individual-level data. Assume for the moment that one did not have individual-level data on the initial selection decision. This means that the Z i would be missing data in the model. Importantly, y 2i is not missing data; for every individual, we know whether the individual is in the selected sample or not. What we do not know are the exogenous characteristics of the non-selected individuals for the selection regression equation. This is the key theoretically benefit of using a Bayesian approach. Missing data is straightforward to model in a Bayesian framework; it is simply another parameter that must be estimated. Thus, the new model would simply treat Z i as a parameter in the model, putting on the parameter side of the line, instead of the data side of the line:
The question simply becomes how to create a prior on Z i that incorporates ones prior knowledge about the individuals driving down the highway; after that, it is technically com- tion between race and sex in the composition of drivers, as well as the higher moments for these variables. Unfortunately, some of these data are also hard to find. Greenland (2003) suggests using prior elicitation or other direct external evidence to create an appropriate prior on the Z i .
The strategy for this project, however, deviates slightly from the standard Bayesian rubric, and uses simulations of potential Z i variables, averaging across simulations to obtain estimates of the posterior distributions of the parameters. To simulate the Z i variables, I use aggregate data on drivers, including the percentage of old cars on the road, distribution of the race and sex of drivers, and when cars are driven; I also include the correlations between these variables to accurately simulate the Z i . These data are culled from highway usage reports as well as census data from the area.
Data
I estimate the model using data from the Maryland State Police (MSP). The data are in two separate files: data on stops which records every stop on the 49.5-mile stretch of I95 north of the City of Baltimore to the Delaware state line, and data on searches, which includes searches throughout the state. The stops data begin in May 1997, and record the location, date and time of the stop, the make of car, any traffic code violation, whether a ticket, warning or safety violation was issued, and the race and sex of the driver. In a subset of the cases, the data also record the posted speed limit and the speed of the vehicle. The search dataset contains additional information, including the stated reason for the search, and whether the search was justified by consent or probable cause. After combining the two datasets, there are 59,070 stops in the dataset from May 1,1999 to December 31, 2005. Narrowing the search dataset to the time period and geographic area covered by the stop dataset yields approximately 525 traffic stops for which search data is also available. Table 2 provides the details of the descriptive statistics for the combined dataset. In addition to these demographic variables, the dataset also contains the ID number of each police officer; I construct dummy variables for each police officer who conducted at least ten searches, and use these in the selection equation as psuedo-instrumental variables.
As Table 2 demonstrates, Black drivers, male drivers, and drivers of old cars are targeted for searches more often. Of targeted cars, those with drivers who are not white or Black are least likely to be found with a controlled substance (CDS); however, these individuals were also most likely to be found with a large amount of drugs (defined as the equivalent of over 500 grams of CDS). Black drivers are more likely to be searched than average, and slightly more likely to be carrying drugs. Men make up the vast majority of the searched individuals (about 75%), and are more likely, according to these descriptive statistics, to be carrying drugs. But, of course, these descriptive statistics suffer from selection bias; one cannot rely on them to determine what the true probability of an individual carrying drugs (or carrying a large amount of drugs) is. The results of the Bayesian model, discussed below, remedy this bias.
Results
The results of the Bayesian selection model, using individual-level data, suggest that the police clearly have a profile that they rely upon, and are therefore "selecting" individuals to be search. The results do not suggest, however, that much selection bias occurs: selection bias only occurs when unobserved (rather than observed) selection is present, and there is little evidence of this in the data. In particular, the distribution of the selection parameter, ρ, significantly overlaps with 0; its mean value is ρ = −0.20 with a standard deviation of σ = 0.13 This means that the selection model is not absolutely required here; still, the model is what determined that no unobserved selection was present. Table 3 provides the specific results with respect to whether or not any amount of contraband was found. The lower left quadrant of the table provides the results of the selection equation, that is, the observed selection criteria. Police officers are significantly more likely to search Black and white motorists (as compared with those of a different race); Black and white motorists are about equally likely to be searched. Women are also more likely to be searched, after controlling for other characteristics. Drivers from instate (Maryland, in this case) are much more likely to be searched, as compared to drivers from New York, who, in turn, are somewhat more likely to be searched than drivers from the other 48 states. 5 The Table 3 provides results relevant to the probability that a random sample (having controlled for unobserved and observed selection) of drivers would be carrying drugs. Here, only a few variables are quite significantly different from zero. Specifically, the drivers who consented to a search were significantly less likely to be found with drugs, despite the apocryphal stories of criminal procedure professors. When one considers, however, that the alternative reason for a search was probable cause, this simply suggests that police officer "hunches" that lead to the request for consent (in the absence of probable cause) are not very useful. 6 The mean and standard deviations of the parameters masks equal to zero. Several others, however, are rarely close to zero; the probability that female drivers a good target for a profile is very low. In contrast, more than 75% of the time, New
York drivers are a good target (being more likely than average to carry drugs). This is also true for Black drivers, although there is more variability, suggesting that it is a harder parameter to measure accurately. On average, drivers at night are also a bad target; they are less likely to carry drugs over 75% of the time. Table 4 provides the results for the model that estimates the probability of finding a large amount of drugs. Here, again, there is very little evidence of unobserved selection, with ρ = −0.08. There is, again, significant observed selection; the bottom left quadrant of Table 4 provides the details, which are quite similar to the selection mechanism estimated for the previous model. 7 There is also a more obvious profile of the optimal target:
it is not a Black or white driver, who are quite likely, in comparison to drivers of other races, to carry large amounts of drugs. While most of the means are quite close to zero, Figure 2 provides the complete distribution of the parameters. Most other parameters are also generally negative, suggesting that these characteristics should form a profile of an individual who should not be targeted for search.
Calibration of the Loss in Precision
Here I compare the individual-level data bayesian model with the aggregate level data model. Tables 3 and 4 provide the results. The aggregate-level model does quite well in comparison using this data, providing very similar results. This may partially be due to the fact that there is not significant unobserved selection in these data; the aggregate model only has to control for observed selection, which is (statistically speaking) an easier task.
However, with that caveat, the results are strikingly similar. In Table 3 , almost all the values are within 10% of the individual-level data model, with the exception of New York plates (which moderated from 1.14 to 0.45), and having an old car (which flipped from -.4 to 0.02, both with large standard deviations). In essence, while there is a loss of precision, while not reported, were generally about half the size, with similar standard deviations). Table 4 provides a similar comparison for the estimation of the large haul outcome.
Here, there is almost no significant differences in results; Black and white drivers still should not be targeted, and others should be targeted less often. 
Application to Maryland State Police

Box Plots of Parameters
One element of the estimation strategy that the model exploits is that individual police officers may have very different search rates (and search critieria). The individual-level model is capable of estimating the specific search probabilities of different individual police officers; indeed, the identification strategy is based upon the assumption that individual officers have different profiles, but once searching, they all have the same intensity of search (i.e., the error term for the outcome equation is uncorrelated with the cop dummies). The model also estimates how likely an officer is to search a vehicle. Figure 3 provides the distributions of the individual cop dummies; these are best viewed as relative likelihoods.
One can see that there are significant differences in selection thresholds for these individuals. Further work could include determining whether the individual officers have different profiles, rather than simply different thresholds for the decision to search.
Extensions
Note: These extensions have not yet been implemented, but hopefully they provide a sense of the flexibility of the statistical approach I am taking.
Modeling Additional Uncertainty
A second advantage of a Bayesian approach to this selection problem is that it is possible to directly model additional uncertainty. This uncertainty comes from two main sources: first, unmeasured confounding variables, and second, data errors. Consider a set of unmeasured confounding variables . Our model of interest expands from p(β, λ, δ|X i , Z i , y 1i , y 2i ) to a similar model indexed by nuisance parameter ν: p(β, λ, δ; ν|X i , Z i , y 1i , y 2i ). The ν are not parameters of direct interest, but instead are nuisance parameters that serve only to complicate the analysis. Theoretically, we are interested in the marginal distribution p(β, λ, δ|X i , Z i , y 1i , y 2i ) which integrates out potential values of ν; in practice, we may only be able to estimate p(β, λ, δ; ν|X i , Z i , y 1i , y 2i ), which estimates the parameters of interest for specific (unknown) values of ν. In a Bayesian setting, we incorporate a prior on ν in order to integrate out the set of nuisance parameters ν and obtain the marginal distribution of interest, p(β, λ, δ|X i , Z i , y 1i , y 2i ). In practice, modeling ν as a single dichotomous variable that incorporates all of the confounding unmeasured variables (akin in some ways to a propensity score) controls for a broad range of unmeasured confounding. (Greenland 2002 ).
The same approach applies for data errors. In many racial profiling cases, there is a strong suggestion that the data that police collect and report are incomplete and perhaps purposefully biased. More specifically, there is evidence that the practice of ghosting, or recording the race of the driver of a stopped or unsuccessfully searched car incorrectly as white instead of Black or Hispanic in order to make the data look less racist. ( The Bayesian model easily incorporates, and thereby controls for, ghosting as well, with a parameter that estimates the probability of ghosting. Let be the race-specific probability of ghosting. Incorporating this probability is a straightforward application of Bayesian law: effectively, it converts the dichotomous race variable (minority/white) in that is an element in and into a probability of being white, specific to each individual. Prior elicitation (through expert witness reports in the court cases in Maryland and Arizona) allows straightforward inclusion of this source of model uncertainty into the complete Bayesian model.
Modeling Simultaneous Choices
The results in Section ?? demonstrate that there are significant tradeoffs in deciding whom to search: picking the individual most likely to carry a large amount of drugs is more likely to be a completely unfruitful search than any other. However, one cannot simply look at the results of two separate models -the model of whether CDS was recovered, and the model of whether a large haul was recovered -to determine what the optimal strategy is. This is because the decision is simultaneous; the model needs to be as well. There are two reasons why the two separate models may not provide the same results as one joint model: first, the two outcomes -large haul and any CDS recovered -are correlated, and two separate models would assume that they are not; and second, the two separate models estimate two separate search decisions, even though there is, in reality, only one decision to search. The Bayesian approach, however, makes modeling several outcomes simultaneously straightforward: instead of estimating two correlated probit equations, one would model 3 (or more) equations: a single selection equation, and multiple outcome equations.
Each outcome equation would have its own selection coefficient (allowing different levels of selection bias for different outcomes) and the outcomes would be correlated with each other.
Modeling Additional Levels of Selection
The model posited above controls for one aggregate selection mechanism. In the racial profiling context, however, there are at least two separable mechanisms: the decision to stop a vehicle, and the decision to search a stopped vehicle. Modeling these processes separately allows one to answer questions regarding each separate decision: what factors did the police use in deciding whether to stop a vehicle? Was the race of the driver salient? Separately, what factors did the police use in deciding whether to search a vehicle? Was the race of the driver salient? While not necessarily completely separate legal questions the use of race in either case triggers an equal protection analysis separating these two decisions separates the equal protection analysis as well. In turn, this separation allows one to focus on the specific actions of the police that may be problematic, and sharpens the normative debate over the appropriate use of race in governmental decision-making in the context of drug interdiction and immigration enforcement. Knowing exactly how race is used in decisionmaking allows for a rich discussion of why race is used, how it is beneficial in that context (or not), and whether racialized decision-making is justified in that context. Because the justifications for the use of race in decision-making, and racial profiling in particular, are so context specific, it is important to separate the two analytically distinct decisions that are made in both the empirical and the normative analysis. To model a second level of selection, one incorporates a third equation into the full model. Similar to modeling simultaneous outcomes, this structure models sequential selection decisions; the limit is (as always) the limit of the data. Again, one re-parametrizes the correlation structure across the three models for ease of estimation. This extension allows the researcher to determine which selection decision creates the most bias, and, from a legal perspective, which decision is most troublesome (for example, the evidence for the use of race is strongest).
Conclusion
This paper develops new methods to control for selection bias without relying on individuallevel data of the non-selected population. The project tests this model against simulations and new data on racial profiling in the context of drug interdiction on the Maryland highway. The estimation finds that Black and white drivers are more likely to be targeted, despite lower probabilities of carrying large amounts of drugs (and about even probabilities of carrying some drugs). This suggests, as an initial matter, that the racial profiling engaged in by the Maryland State Police was not efficient, and that a more efficient profile would focus on other minorities than Black drivers and men. The consequences of this more efficient profile are, when looking only at direct costs, win-win: less innocent individuals would be targeted, and more drug dealers (as opposed to simple users) would be found. Further investigation would provide additional information about the possible tradeoffs to be made, as well as quantify how uncertainty or misspecification affects the results.
While focusing on selection bias in the racial profiling context, this project has wide applicably to many empirical questions, and provides a significant step in controlling for selection bias when individual-level data is unavailable.
